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The conventional view is that a monetary policy shock has both supply-side and 
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future inflation is mainly due to supply shocks, the South African Reserve Bank 
should not apply contractionary policy to fight inflation, as this would lead to a 
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 1 Introduction
The conventional view suggests that monetary authorities should adjust the nominal short-term interest rate
gradually and su±ciently to alter the real rate in the direction that o®sets any movement in expected future
in°ation (Clarida et al., 1999). A contractionary monetary policy shock should, in principle, decrease future
in°ation. However, empirical evidence shows a positive and signi¯cant response of price level to positive
innovations in the nominal short-term interest rate, the so-called price puzzle in the literature.
Price puzzle evidence was ¯rst noted by Sims (1992) and labeled by Eichenbaum (1992). To characterize
the dynamic e®ects of monetary policy disturbances, Sims (1992) uses vector autoregressive (VAR) models
and shows that the price puzzle emerges in most developed countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, the
U.K. and the U.S. That is, a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a sharp, persistent increase
in price level. As pointed out by Eichenbaum (1992), this VAR-based empirical evidence is an obvious
challenge to Keynesians, Monetarists, and Real Business Cycle Theorists. According to Sims (1992), the
price puzzle arises due to the misidenti¯cation of monetary policy shocks. Monetary authorities may have
more information on expected future in°ation than a VAR could capture. For instance, once a commodity
price index is included in the VAR, econometricians would no longer observe the puzzle.
An alternative explanation for the price puzzle suggests that it is due to the cost-channel e®ect of monetary
policy shocks. Barth and Ramey (2001) present aggregate and industry-level evidence that suggests a cost-
channel of monetary transmission can potentially explain the price puzzle. Studies using general equilibrium
models to explicitly analyze the cost-channel (supply-side) e®ect of a monetary policy shock all assume ¯rms
have to borrow funds to pay their factors of production before they sell their product1. As a result, an
increase in the nominal short-term interest rate increases the prices of the factors of production, and hence
in°ation ensues.
Besides the sharp, persistent increase in price level, a contractionary monetary policy shock also leads to
a signi¯cant, persistent decline in real output. This degree of ampli¯cation puzzle noted by Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) implies that contractionary policy can neither forestall in°ation, nor improve the short-run
output/in°ation trade-o® if the cost-channel of monetary transmission is present.
This paper examines the e®ects of monetary policy for the South African economy from a New Keynesian
perspective. In particular, we study under what circumstance the South African Reserve Bank (SARB
1See Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano et al. (1997), Farmer (1984), and Farmer (1988).
2hereafter) should apply contractionary policy to ¯ght in°ation2. To do so, we compare the dynamic responses
of output and in°ation to a contractionary policy shock in a simpli¯ed version of Smets and Wouters (2007)
New Keynesian model, with and without the cost-channel of monetary cost-channel of monetary transmission.
We argue that whether SARB should raise the nominal short-term interest rate in an e®ort to forestall
in°ation depends on whether an increase in expected demand shocks or supply shocks. We show that in the
presence of the cost-channel of monetary transmission, the nominal short-term interest rate acts as a cost-
push shock: an increase in the nominal short-term interest rate raises the real marginal cost of production,
and hence in°ation ensues. The SARB can only succeed in ¯ghting in°ation by increasing the nominal
short-term interest rate if an increase in expected future in°ation is mainly due to demand shocks, or put
di®erently, the demand-side e®ect dominates the cost-channel e®ect of monetary policy shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the VAR-based empirical evidence for the South African
economy. Section 3 describes the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
the cost-channel of monetary transmission. Section 4 presents the simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
The VAR includes three variables, and the ordering of the variables is real output, in°ation, and the nominal
short-term interest rate. The estimated VAR contains four lags of each variable, and the sample period
is 1970:Q1-2010:Q4. Data are taken from the SARB Quarterly Bulletin. Figure 1 presents the impulse
response functions of output, in°ation, and the nominal interest rate to a contractionary policy shock. A
monetary policy shock is identi¯ed as a shock to the policy rate, the nominal short-term interest rate. It is
not surprising that the price puzzle emerges in the South African data. In response to an increase in interest
rate, in°ation increases immediately and then starts declining slowly.
One explanation for the price puzzle is that it is due to the cost-channel (supply-side) e®ect dominating
the demand-side e®ect of the monetary policy shock. That is, a monetary policy shock has an e®ect primarily
through increases in production costs, resulting in an increase in aggregate prices. For instance, if an increase
in expected future in°ation is predicted to be due to an increase in the oil price, increasing the policy rate
is not going to bring down future in°ation. The increase in oil price will have already raised the production
2The SARB is one of those central banks that adopt in°ation targeting as its monetary policy. Therefore, it is important
for SARB to have a better understanding of the e®ects of monetary policy on in°ation in particular.













Figure 2: In°ation, interest rate, and oil price
































































4costs for ¯rms. If the monetary authorities ignore the cost-channel e®ect of monetary policy shocks and
simply increase the policy rate to ¯ght in°ation, it is no di®erent to \throwing gasoline on ¯re" (Barth and
Ramey, 2001). Figure 2 plots in°ation, the nominal short-term interest rate, and the (ln) oil price during
the period of 2005Q1-2010Q4. It shows that monetary policy shifts are highly correlated with oil price
shocks, as suggested by Hoover and Perez (1994). The patterns for in°ation and the oil price over the period
2005Q1-2009Q2 are almost identical. The oil price increased gradually from 2007Q1 to 2008Q2 and dropped
sharply from 2008Q3, and in°ation followed in the same manner. During the period 2007Q1-2008Q2, SARB
kept hiking the interest rate without any success in ¯ghting in°ation. One might argue that it was due to the
policy time lags that in°ation only started declining from 2008Q3. In fact, the oil price dropped sharply from
2008Q3, indicating that during the period 2007Q1-2008Q2, the persistent increase in in°ation was probably
due to the cost-channel e®ect of monetary policy shocks.
3 A model with the cost-channel of monetary transmission
The basic framework of the baseline model presented here is a simpli¯ed version of Smets and Wouters (2007)
model. The model has many features typical of a standard dynamic New Keynesian model with nominal
rigidities. The cost-channel of monetary transmission is introduced into the model, as in Rabanal (2007).
That is, a fraction of ¯rms have to borrow funds to pay for their wage bill before selling their products.
3.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of in¯nitely-lived households. In each period t = 0;1;2;:::, a representa-
tive household makes a sequence of decisions to maximize her expected utility over a composite consumption











where ¯ is the subjective discount factor. ´c is the coe±cient of the relative risk aversion of household and
´n is the inverse of the elasticity of work e®ort with respect to real wage. The habit formation parameter
h measures the importance of the reference level relative to current consumption. As suggested by Fuhrer
(2000), Amato and Thomas (2004), and Bouakez et al. (2005), including habit formation in household's utility
5function improves the short-run dynamic of the model in terms of replicating the hump-shaped response of
consumption to monetary policy and other shocks.
In each time period t, the representative household carries the government bond Bt¡1 from the previous
period into the current period, and receives a lump-sum transfer Tt from the monetary authority and a
nominal pro¯t or dividend payment Dt from the intermediate-good ¯rms. In addition, the household receives
its usual labor income WtNt, where Wt denotes the nominal wage. Therefore, in each time period, the
representative household maximizes her expected utility (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
















Besides the intertemporal budget constraint (2), the representative household is also subject to the
following capital accumulation constraint as in Christiano et al. (2005):







where ± is the depreciation rate, and Xt is gross investment. The function S captures the presence of
investment adjustment cost3.



















Equation (4) is the consumption Euler equation with external habit formation. It represents the in-
tertemporal allocation of consumption, where consumption for the current period depends on a weighted
average of previous and expected future consumption. Equation (5) is the Lucas asset price equation for
capital. Pk;t is the shadow value of the installed capital, which depends on both the expected future value
of capital and its return rk;t, taking into account the depreciation rate. The investment equation (6), which
3In steady state, S(¢) = 0; S0(¢) = 0; S00(¢) > 0.
4A lowercase letter represents its log deviation from steady state.
6contains both backward-looking and forward-looking components, describes the dynamics of investment. º
is the investment adjustment cost parameter, º = S00(¢).
3.2 Final goods production
In the ¯nal-good sector, ¯rms are perfectly competitive. The representative ¯rm produces the ¯nal good Yt
using a continuum of intermediate goods Yj;t indexed by j (j 2 [0;1]), according to a constant elasticity of











where 'p;t measures the time-varying price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good Yj;t. It acts as
a price markup shock in the goods market.
The representative ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t, and the ¯rst-order condition implies the demand for each





where Pj;t is the price of the intermediate good j, and Pt is the price for the ¯nal good. Since the ¯nal-good
¯rms operate in a perfectly competitive market, in equilibrium the representative ¯rm's pro¯t should equal









3.3 Intermediate goods production
In the intermediate-good sector, ¯rms are monopolistically competitive. In each time period, the represen-





j;t ; 0 < ® < 1 (10)
7where »z;t is the technology shock.
Households supply Nj;t units of labor to the representative ¯rm j. The aggregate labor demand Nt is











where 'w;t measures the time-varying price elasticity of demand for di®erent types of labor. It acts as a
wage markup shock in the labor market.
Staggered wages are introduced in the manner proposed by Erceg et al. (2000). Households are price
setters in the labor market. In other words, wages are taken as a given by the intermediate-good ¯rms.
Following Calvo (1983), in each time period only a random fraction 1¡µw of households have the opportunity
to reset their wages. This fraction is independent across households and time. In addition, the model assumes
that households who cannot reset their wages simply index to lagged in°ation as in Christiano et al. (2005).






)°wWj;t¡1]1¡'w;t + (1 ¡ µw)(W¤
j;t)1¡'w;t; 0 · µw · 1; 0 · °w · 1 (12)
where °w is the degree of wage indexation, and W¤
j;t represents the nominal wage level chosen by those
households who can reset their wages at time period t.
The intermediate-good ¯rms face the same restriction in setting their prices. In each time period, the
probability of being able to reset prices is 1¡µp, and ¯rms who cannot reset their prices also index to lagged






)°pPj;t¡1]1¡'p;t + (1 ¡ µp)(P¤
j;t)1¡'p;t; 0 · µp · 1; 0 · °p · 1 (13)
The linearized ¯rst-order conditions are given by:
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Equation (14) implies that the real marginal cost is a function of the real rental rate of capital and the
real wage, since capital and labor are used in producing the intermediate goods. The real wage equation (15)
states that, under staggered wage contracts, the representative household takes into account not only past and
expected future real wages, but also past, current, and expected future in°ation rates. The representative
household sets her real wage higher than the marginal rate of substitution, since she knows there is a
possibility that she may not be able to reset her wage in the future. It is worth noting that the real wage
equation contains both backward-looking and forward-looking components, which induce inertia in in°ation
through marginal costs5. The New Keynesian Phillips curve (16) implies that in°ation depends on past and
expected future in°ation. It also shows that the price indexation parameter °p governs persistence in the
response of in°ation to a given shock. If °p = 0, equation (16) becomes a purely forward-looking Phillips
curve. Finally, it shows that in°ation is a function of the current marginal cost, and that both °p and µp
govern the contribution of marginal cost to the persistent response of in°ation. Here, we follow Gali and
Gertler (1999)'s argument that, as the theory suggests, real marginal cost is a signi¯cant and quantitatively
important determinant of in°ation, instead of an ad hoc output gap.
3.4 Monetary authority
The monetary authority adjusts its instrument, the nominal short-term interest rate, in response to the
deviations of output and in°ation from their steady-state values:
it = ·iit¡1 + (1 ¡ ·i)(·¼¼t + ·yyt) + »i;t (17)
5As shown in (14), marginal cost is an increasing function of real wages, and marginal cost appears in the in°ation equation
(16).
9The monetary policy shock »i;t is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
»i;t = ½i»i;t¡1 + ²i;t; 0 · ½i < 1; ²i;t » i:i:d:(0;¾2
i ) (18)
3.5 Introducing the cost-channel of monetary transmission
Following Rabanal (2007), we introduce the cost-channel of monetary transmission by assuming that a
fraction of ¯rms have to borrow funds to pay their wage bill before they receive revenues from sales. As a
result, the policy rate a®ects the marginal cost of hiring an extra unit of labor, and hence the real marginal
cost of production. If the cost-channel of monetary transmission is present, the linearized real marginal cost
14 becomes:
mct = ®rk;t + (1 ¡ ®)(wt + °it) ¡ »z;t (19)
This approach of introducing the cost-channel of monetary transmission was originally proposed by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). By assuming that workers must be paid in advance of production and
¯rms have to borrow money from a ¯nancial intermediary to pay their wage bill at the beginning of the
period6, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) introduce an additional component into the cost of labor. That
is, the marginal cost of hiring an extra unit of labor becomes the product of the real wage and the nominal
short-term interest rate. The policy rate a®ects the real marginal cost directly, whereas real marginal cost
is a signi¯cant and quantitatively important determinant of in°ation, as discussed in Section 3.3. Therefore,
an increase in the policy rate increases in°ation through the cost-channel of monetary transmission.
4 Simulation and results
In this Section, we investigate the e®ects of monetary policy for the South African economy. The baseline
model, a New Keynesian model with the cost-channel of monetary transmission, is calibrated to the South
African economy7. We conduct a number of simulation exercises that are based on the baseline model and
its variants to investigate when the SARB should apply contractionary policy to forestall in°ation.
6Which is the case for ° = 1 in Rabanal (2007).
7For the details of calibration, see Appendix.
104.1 The cost-channel e®ect of monetary policy
We ¯rst study the dynamic responses of output, in°ation, and the policy rate to a contractionary policy
shock in the baseline model with and without the cost-channel of monetary transmission. By setting ° = 0,
the assumption that a fraction of ¯rms need to borrow money to pay their wage bill before selling their
product no longer holds. For the model including the cost channel of monetary transmission (the baseline
model), we set ° = 0:7, which implies that more than half of the ¯rms have to borrow money to pay their
wage bill.
Figure 3 shows that without the cost-channel of monetary transmission, the impulse response function of
in°ation to a contractionary policy shock is inconsistent with the VAR-based empirical evidence presented in
Section 2. Following the monetary contraction, in°ation decreases immediately and starts increasing three
quarters after the shock occurs, and it eventually reverts to its steady state after ten quarters. This indicates
that a standard New Keynesian model is not capable of mimicking the price puzzle produced by an estimated
VAR. In the absence of labor market frictions, a contractionary policy shock causes a substantial decline
in labor demand and investment. As a result, monetary contraction leads to a substantial decline in real
wages and the rental rate of capital rk;t, and hence, the real marginal cost of production. Therefore, in°ation
always declines in response to a contractionary policy shock.
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) show that in a standard New Keynesian model with the cost-channel of
monetary transmission, ¯rms' real marginal cost depends directly on the policy rate. As a result, the policy
rate acts as a cost-push shock, and in°ation always increases in response to an increase in the policy rate
through the cost-channel of monetary transmission. As shown in Figure 3, the baseline model, a standard
New Keynesian model with the cost-channel of monetary transmission, successfully mimics the price puzzle
observed in an estimated VAR. It suggests that, in the presence of the cost-channel of monetary transmission,
the SARB would not succeed in ¯ghting in°ation simply by mechanically following the conventional view
that a contractionary policy should, in principle, decrease future in°ation.
Figure 3 also shows the e®ects of the shock on output and the policy rate. The responses of output and
policy rate to monetary contraction are consistent with the VAR-based empirical evidence. A contractionary
policy shock leads to a substantial persistent decrease in output and an increase in the policy rate. Moreover,
the response of output is stronger in the presence of the cost-channel than that without it, indicating that
11Figure 3: Model with cost-channel (solid line) vs model without cost-channel (dashed line)























the cost-channel of monetary transmission ampli¯es the impacts of monetary policy shock on real variables
in the short run.
4.2 Cost-channel (supply-side) e®ect vs demand-side e®ect
As discussed in Section 4.1, monetary policy shocks have both supply-side and demand-side e®ects, at least
in the short run. It appears that, in the absence of the cost-channel, a contractionary policy shock always
leads to a persistent decline in in°ation due to the usual demand-side e®ect: an increase in the policy rate
discourages investment and decreases labor demand, and hence, results in a decline in real wage and return
on capital. However, Barth and Ramey (2001) argue that the cost-channel e®ect of a monetary policy shock
may be greater than the demand-side e®ect. Therefore, it is crucial for SARB to understand whether, or to
what extent, an increase in expected future in°ation is due to supply shocks, before applying contractionary
policy to forestall in°ation.
In this section, we conduct the second simulation exercise to investigate to what extent the cost-channel
e®ect dominates the demand-side e®ect of a monetary policy shock. In the baseline model, parameter
° controls the fraction of ¯rms that have to borrow money to pay their wage bill before they sell their
12products. The policy rate a®ects the marginal cost of hiring an extra unit of labor, and hence, the real
marginal cost of production, whereas ° determines the magnitude of the impact of the policy rate on real
marginal cost. Therefore, it is possible to investigate the extent of the cost-channel e®ect of a monetary
policy shock by controlling the value of parameter °.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions of in°ation to monetary contraction, with di®erent values
for parameter °. In the case of ° = 1, it simply assumes that all ¯rms have to borrow money to pay their
wages bill before they sell their products, meaning the strongest cost-channel e®ect of monetary policy exists
in the model. As the value of ° declines, the cost-channel e®ect becomes weaker and weaker. Based on
our simulation exercises, we ¯nd that the demand-side e®ect of monetary policy shock starts dominating if
° < 0:36. As a result, a contractionary policy shock leads to a persistent decline in in°ation, and the price
puzzle disappears. Therefore, the SARB can only succeed in ¯ghting in°ation by applying contractionary
policy if an increase in expected future in°ation is mainly due to demand shocks.
If the cost-channel e®ect dominates, an increase in the policy rate increases real marginal cost immediately,
and hence, in°ation ensues. In°ation only starts to decline two quarters after the shock occurs. If the SARB
keeps hiking the policy rate to ¯ght in°ation, as it did over the period 2007Q1-2008Q2, instead of a decline
in future in°ation, what the SARB would face is a persistent increase in future in°ation. This is because
a cost-push shock arises endogenously with the presence of the cost-channel of monetary transmission in a
standard New Keynesian model (Ravenna and Walsh, 2006). As a result, every increase in the policy rate
exaggerates the cost-channel e®ect of the monetary policy shock and continuously increases real marginal
cost, and hence, in°ation ensues. Therefore, it is not surprising that in°ation followed the same path as the
policy rate in 2007 and 2008, as is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 5 shows that regardless of whether the cost-channel e®ect dominates the demand-side e®ect of a
monetary policy shock, monetary contraction always leads to a persistent decline in output. However, as
the cost-channel e®ect increases (increase in °), monetary contraction leads to a greater decline in output.
That is, in the presence of the cost-channel, a contractionary policy shock has an e®ect primarily through
production costs, resulting in a persistent decline in output and an increase in in°ation. The cost of ¯ghting
in°ation increases as the cost-channel e®ect increases. Once the cost-channel e®ect starts dominating the
demand-side e®ect of the monetary policy shock (° > 0:36), the SARB would face an increase in in°ation
and a greater loss in output when implementing a monetary contraction to forestall in°ation.
13Figure 4: Policy e®ect on in°ation: cost-channel (supply-side) e®ect vs demand-side e®ect
















Figure 5: Policy e®ect on output: cost-channel (supply-side) e®ect vs demand-side e®ect


















In this paper, we study the e®ects of monetary policy on the South African economy, speci¯cally on in°ation
and output. The conventional view suggests that a contractionary monetary policy shock should decrease
future in°ation, whereas the empirical evidence shows a signi¯cantly positive response of in°ation to the
shock. Using a standard New Keynesian model with the cost-channel of monetary transmission, we show
that the puzzle emerges only if the cost-channel e®ect dominates the demand-side e®ect of a monetary policy
shock.
Whether or not the SARB should apply contractionary policy to forestall in°ation depends critically
on the nature of the disturbance. In principle, if an increase in expected future in°ation is predicted to
be mainly due to supply shocks, the SARB should not apply contractionary policy to forestall in°ation.
Otherwise, the bank would face persistent increases in in°ation and a greater loss in output. What the
South African economy experienced in 2007 and 2008 could be a good lesson.
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17Appendix: Calibration
The baseline model is calibrated to the South African economy. The parameter values of the model are
assigned according to the measured data during the sample period of 1970 to 20108. Data are taken from
the SARB Quarterly Bulletin.
The annual aggregate capital depreciation rate ± is obtained from the annual averaged values of I
Y and
K
Y . This yields an annual depreciation rate of 0.076, or a quarterly rate of 0.019. The standard real business
cycle literature suggests that the capital and labor shares of output have been approximately constant. The
capital output share ® is equal to 0.26, whereas the labor output share 1¡® is 0.74. The steady state capital
to output ratio K
Y is equal to 1.7. The discount factor ¯ is set at 0.99 as in the literature. The coe±cient of
relative risk aversion ´c is set at one, whereas the inverse of the elasticity of work e®ort with respect to real
wage ´n is set at 1.5. The habit formation parameter h is set at 0.7, which is consistent with the literature
(Rabanal, 2007). In the baseline model, we set ° as equal to 0.7, meaning more than half of ¯rms (70%)
need to borrow money to pay their wage bill before they sell their products.
The Calvo parameters and fraction coe±cients of wage and price indexation are set as the following. The
Calvo sticky wage parameter µw is assumed to be 0.75, which implies that wages are ¯xed on average for
four quarters or a year. Prices are ¯xed on average for two quarters, i.e. µp = 0:5. The degree of wage
indexation is set at 0.7, whereas the degree of price indexation is set at 0.5.
The parameters of the monetary policy rule, ·i, ·¼, and ·y, are set at 0.73, 1.11, and 0.27 respectively.
These values are taken from Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007)9. As suggested by Clarida et al. (1999), monetary
authorities should adjust the policy rate su±ciently (more than one-for-one with expected future in°ation)
to o®set the disturbance in expected future in°ation. That is, ·¼ should be greater than one. Finally, the
persistence parameter of monetary policy shock is set at 0.75.
8See Table 1.
9Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) use a DSGE model to estimate SARB's policy reaction rule, where SARB's policy rule is a
similar Taylor type of rule as the one in the baseline model.
18Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Comments
µp 0.5 Calvo sticky price parameter
µw 0.75 Calvo sticky wage parameter
°p 0.5 Degree of price index
°w 0.7 Degree of wage index
K
Y 1.7 Steady state ratio of capita to output
® 0.26 Capital share of output
¯ 0.99 Discount rate
h 0.7 Habit formation parameter
´c 1 Coe±cient of relative risk aversion of household
´n 1.5 The inverse of the elasticity of work e®ort with respect to real wage
± 0.019 Capital depreciation rate
° 0.7 Fraction of ¯rms that need to borrow money to pay their wage bill
½i 0.75 AR(1) parameter of monetary policy shock
·i 0.73 Parameter of lagged policy rate in Taylor rule
·¼ 1.11 Parameter of in°ation in Taylor rule
·y 0.27 Parameter of output in Taylor rule
19